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Summary 
Abusive behaviour by dominant undertakings is regulated in Article 82 EC. 
One of the ways to abuse a dominant position is through tying or bundling, 
and Article 82(d) states that: 
 
“making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
Tying can take different forms, but its essence is that the seller supplies the 
consumer with a product or a service on the condition that he or she also 
obtains something else, and thereby “ties” two or more products together. 
The practice is often criticized on the grounds that it takes away the 
purchaser’s freedom of choice, forecloses competitors, and enables 
companies to extend their monopoly into the market of the tied product. 
Tying is however not always harmful, since as a result of the practice a 
number of benefits can be achieved for both customers and producers. This 
is one of the reasons why the Commission’s and the Community Courts’ 
hostile treatment of tying has been so criticized. 
 
Tying has only been dealt with in a small number of cases in the EC, where 
the most important ones are Hilti, Tetra Pak II and Microsoft. Prior to 
Microsoft, a per se approach was consistently applied in all tying cases. The 
test when assessing tying cases was threefold, and a finding of market 
power, separate products and coercion was enough for a tying practice to be 
considered abusive. It appears as though the Commission and the Courts 
have been focusing on the form when assessing tying arrangements, rather 
than the actual effects of the practice. Since tying can actually have pro-
competitive effects, a per se prohibition seems rather outdated and scholars 
have therefore been arguing that a rule of reason approach would be more 
appropriate.  
 
In Microsoft it seems as though the Commission has listened to the 
arguments put forward. A new analytical framework was applied in the 
Commission’s decision, where the actual foreclosure effect was assessed. 
This suggests a move towards a rule of reason approach by the 
Commission. Still, the Microsoft case differs from earlier tying cases since 
it deals with technological tying. This makes it hard to predict whether the 
Commission’s approach was a change in attitude towards tying, or just valid 
for this particular case.  
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Nonetheless, it is obvious that the last years’ criticism against the 
application of Article 82 EC has been heard. As a reaction, the Commission 
issued “The DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 
82 EC to exclusionary abuses”, in 2005. The purpose of the Discussion 
Paper was to revise the application of Article 82 EC, including the approach 
towards tying. When Neelie Kroes spoke about the Article 82 revision at 
Fordham, she said that it is important that the exercise of market power is 
assessed based on its effects in the market. She also said that aggressive 
competition is good, as long as it ultimately benefits the consumers. Despite 
these intentions the Discussion Paper is to a large extent a restatement of 
the case law of the Community courts and the Commission. It is not the 
radical move towards a more economics-based rule of reason approach that 
some might have expected. Hopefully the next step in the Commission’s 
revision will be some kind of guidelines that will help clarify the unclear 
approach towards tying in the EC. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The number one concern for competition law is the problems that will arise 
when one or several companies possess market power. The fear is that it 
provides the undertaking with the possibility to restrict output and raise 
prices, which will ultimately be to the customers’ disadvantage.1 In its 
application of Article 82 EC over the years, the Commission has frequently 
been accused of using the article, not only to protect the competitive 
process, but rather the competitors.2 In reaction to this critique, the 
Commission decided that a revision of Article 82 EC was necessary. As a 
result, “The DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses”, was issued in December 2005. 
The purpose of the discussion paper has not been to provide guidelines for 
the interpretation of Article 82, but rather to investigate how the article has 
been applied over the years. After a discussion around this subject, 
hopefully some much needed guidelines on this matter will follow. 
 
One way for a company to abuse its dominant position is through tying. 
Article 82(d) EC states that: “making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts” may be an abuse of dominance.  
 
There are three leading cases on tying in EC competition law: Hilti, Tetra 
Pak II and Microsoft. In all of these cases the Commission has found the 
companies guilty of abusive tying. When the Commission issued its 
decision in the Microsoft case, it generated a new interest for tying abuses 
and article 82(d) EC. This decision, together with the Commission’s 
discussion paper, has made the discussion around the approach towards 
tying more vivid than ever. Many experts are giving voice to the request for 
a more economics-based analysis in tying cases. There is also a demand that 
the law is being used more in line with how it was intended to. Today the 
critics say that in the application of the article, track has been lost of its 
original aim, and that instead of protecting the competitive process and the 
consumers, it tends to protect companies from being excluded from the 
market. For the purpose of this paper I have investigated the approach 
towards tying in the EC. There are three questions in focus in this thesis: 
First of all: Do we have a clear and coherent approach towards tying in the 
EC today? Secondly: How should tying be treated in the context of Article 
82(d)? And at last: Which effect can be expected from the Commission’s 
discussion paper?  
                                                 
1 Whish, p. 21. 
2 Ibid, p. 149. 
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1.2 Disposition 
This paper starts by a general introduction to Article 82 EC as well as the 
identification and definition of the relevant provisions for its application to 
abuses. The second part consists of a further explanation of the concept of 
tying and bundling and some of the reasons for companies to engage in 
these practices. In the third part, the existing case law on the matter will be 
presented briefly, before the more extensive analysis of the three major 
cases; Hilti, Tetra Pak II and Microsoft. At last I will identify and try to 
analyse the Commission’s approach in the Discussion paper from 2005. 
Based on the findings in the case law and the Commission’s discussion 
paper, conclusions will be drawn in the analysis to define where the EC law 
is heading regarding tying abuses. 
 
 
1.3 Delimination 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how tying and bundling is being 
treated under Article 82(d). Except from the first part of this paper, where I 
will treat the general conditions for the application of Article 82, I will only 
focus on tying and bundling in relation to this article. 
 
Some of the cases in this paper involve more than one abuse under Article 
82. For the above-mentioned reasons, I have limited the analysis to the parts 
of the judgments and decisions that concern paragraph (d). 
 
When discussing tying and bundling, even through a legal perspective, some 
economic analysis is inevitable for the understanding of the concepts and 
the effects of these practices. The debate around the reform of Article 82 has 
to a great extent been based on a request for an economic analysis in the 
abuse cases as a factor to assess their effects. Therefore, even though I am 
not an economist, some economic facts and reflections will be presented in 
this paper. For these parts the DTI Economics paper has been a valuable 
source for me in, as well as the GCLC Research paper and the Report by the 
EAGCP. 
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1.4 Method and material 
 
The method that I have used for this thesis is the traditional legal method.  
For my research I have studied books, articles, research papers, Commission 
decisions and judgments from the Community courts. There are quite a lot 
of books dealing with Article 82 and tying and these have been a great 
source of information for me for the first part of this paper. They give a 
good introduction to Article 82 and the general provisions for its 
application. They have also provided some guidance to the case law, since 
most of the case law on tying is rather old. 
 
When it comes to the more recent Microsoft case, I have found valuable 
information in articles published in various legal journals. Still, in my 
opinion, an overall problem when it comes to the case law is the lack of 
actual criticism of the Commission decisions and Community court 
judgments. Most authors fail to actually analyse them, instead they deliver a 
description of the outcome. In order to actually understand the status of 
tying in the EC, I believe that it is important to break down the judgments 
and analyse the approach taken in each case. 
 
Some of the publications that I have found have been of particular value to 
me. The DTI Economics paper no. 1 by Barry Nalebuff has been a great 
source for me in order to understand the economic aspects of tying and 
bundling. The Report by the EAGCP and the GCLC Research papers on 
Article 82 EC have provided me with invaluable information about the tying 
approach in the EC, both historically and currently.  
 
As for the Commission’s discussion paper it is fairly new and not many 
comments by well renowned scholars have been published. Nevertheless, I 
have been able to find some comments in legal journals and I have also 
analysed the paper in the light of the existing case law. 
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2 Abuse of a dominant position 
2.1 The objectives of Article 82 
Article 3(1)(g) EC sets down that there shall be a system in the Community 
“ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”. Article 82 
EC is a central provision of this system and states that: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
unfair trading conditions 
b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers 
c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage 
d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their mature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
 
The essence of Article 82 EC is the control of market power. The article 
should be applied to a single, dominant company that abuses its market 
power in one of the ways that is provided in the article. However, the list is 
not exhaustive, it only gives examples of what can constitute such abuse. 
This was clarified by the ECJ in Continental Can3. 
 
According to the first phrase of the article, the dominant position can be 
held not only by one undertaking, but also several together.4 The objective 
of Article 82 EC is to protect the competitive process, even though this is 
not a goal in itself. The competitors should have the possibility to compete 
on the merits, since ultimately this will benefit the consumers. The 
protection of the competitive process is motivated by the idea that it is in the 
consumers best interest that companies are forced to compete. This will lead 
to the best quality in products and the lowest prices.5
 
Article 82 does not prohibit market power or monopoly per se. It is the 
behaviour of the company with market power that is the object of the policy 
and not its existence in itself. As the wording of the article clearly states, it 
is the abuse of market power that is prohibited. A company in a dominant 
                                                 
3 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission para. 26. 
4 Craig and De Búrca, p. 992. 
5 Eilmansberger, p. 133ff. 
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position has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair 
undistorted competition on the common market. As we shall se later in this 
paper, this responsibility becomes greater and the finding of dominance 
more likely, the more market shares a company has.6
 
In order for Article 82 EC to be applicable in the first place, the company 
has to have a dominant position on the market. The fact that a company is 
dominant is not an offence in itself, but it imposes a special responsibility 
on the dominant company, not to distort competition on the common 
market.7
 
 
2.2 Establishing dominance 
2.2.1 Relevant market 
2.2.1.1 The product market 
The first step when determining whether a company holds a dominant 
position on the market is to define the relevant market. Article 82 EC speaks 
of: 
 
“a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of 
it”. 
 
The definition of the relevant market is twofold; both the product market 
and the geographical market must be defined, in order to establish which 
companies impose a competitive constraint on the company that is under 
investigation. In the EU, the most important source for this identification is 
the Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the 
Purposes of Community Competition Law8. “The Notice” is based on the 
case law from the ECJ and the CFI, as well as the Commission’s decisions 
and provides guidelines for the techniques that may be used when defining 
markets. It is however important to keep in mind that the Notice is not a 
legal instrument, and should therefore only be seen as advisory. 
 
The first time the ECJ heard an appeal on the application of Article 82 EC 
was in Continental Can9 in 1973. The Court emphasized in this judgment 
the importance of defining the relevant product market in such cases. Since 
then, the Court has repeated this importance in several of its following 
judgments. It follows from the ECJ’s case law, that the central issue when 
defining the relevant market is whether products or services are 
                                                 
6 Whish, p. 194. 
7 Ibid, p. 189. 
8 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, OJ C 372/5 [1997]. 
9 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission. 
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interchangeable. For example, a copy machine can be replaced by another 
copy machine from another manufacturer, a car can be replaced by another 
car and so on. In theory this might sound easy, but the scope of a product 
market is often subject to discussion, since ultimately it is a matter of 
interpretation. 
 
According to paragraph 13 of the Notice, there are three main competitive 
constraints; demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential 
competition. When determining the relevant market, it is the demand 
substitutability that is of importance because it tells us which products the 
consumer sees as substitutes. To determine whether certain products are 
within the same market, the Notice introduces the SSNIP test. It originally 
comes from the US competition law and stands for Small but Significant 
Non-transitory Increase in Price. The idea of the test is a hypothetical 
question. If the seller of product A should increase the price, would buyers 
then switch to another supplier of product A, or would they even switch to 
product B? If the answer to this question is yes, this suggests that the market 
is at least as wide as product A. If they will even switch to product B, this 
suggests that the market includes both A and B. 
 
2.2.1.2 The geographic market 
The geographic market refers to a physical area. It can be for example the 
EU or a part of the EU, such as a country. It was in United Brands10 that the 
ECJ declared for the first time that the geographical market should be 
defined. The Commission’s Notice and the SSNIP test provide help also 
when defining the geographical market. If a supplier in Sweden raises the 
price, will the buyer switch to a supplier in Denmark instead? If a company 
can raise its prices without losing any customers, this indicates that the 
market is worth monopolizing. Therefore, the SSNIP test is also called the 
“hypothetical monopolist test”. 11
 
2.2.2 Market power 
The next step is to establish that the company has a dominant position. The 
word dominance is abstract, but when it is used in a commercial context it 
refers to a position of substantial power for an undertaking in relation to a 
specific product market and within a relevant geographic market, which 
both must be defined.12 In the EC, the term dominant position is a legal 
concept that has been developed by the Commission and the courts. It 
should be separated from the economists’ perception of the same term.13 
How the concept of dominance should be defined was considered 
thoroughly by the ECJ for the first time in United Brands14. The ECJ started 
                                                 
10 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission. 
11 For a more extensive discussion on the relevant market, see Whish, p. 23-48 and Bishop 
and Walker p. 82-131. 
12 Goyder, p. 268. 
13 Korah, 2004, p. 94. 
14 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission.  
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by saying that in order to determine whether a company has a dominant 
position on the market in question, it is necessary to define this market from 
both the standpoint of the product and from the geographic point of view.15 
Subsequently the following definition was laid down:  
 
“The dominant position referred to in this article relates to a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”16  
 
In this judgment the ECJ sets down two conditions for a dominant position: 
the ability to prevent competition and the ability to behave independently. 
Whish questions their relation to each other, as he does not consider it to be 
clear. However he seems to be of the opinion that the central issue is the 
company’s ability to act independently on the market.17 A large number of 
companies possess market power to a certain degree. However the reference 
to a company’s ability to behave independently to an appreciable extent 
indicates that the target of the article is not the minimal amount of market 
power that most companies enjoy.18
 
2.2.2.1 Market shares 
Not long after the United Brands judgment the Court developed this 
definition even more in Hoffmann-La Roche19. It quoted its own definition 
from United Brands and then went on to the question of market shares: 
 
“The existence of a dominant position may derive from several factors 
which, taken separately, are not necessarily determinative but among these 
factors a highly important one is the existence of very large market 
shares.”20
 
A company’s market share is an important tool for assessing market power. 
There is no specific share of the market that automatically gives a company 
a dominant position. Still, the ECJ said in Hoffmann-La Roche that very 
large market shares are in themselves evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position.21 There are a few general guidelines to keep in mind for 
establishing dominance. A company that holds less than 25% of the market 
share is very unlikely to be considered to be in a dominant position. This 
can be concluded by analogy from the Merger Regulation22, which states 
that: 
                                                 
15 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission, para 10. 
16 Ibid, para 65. 
17 Whish, p. 152f. 
18 Geradin, Hofer, Louis, Petit and Walker, GCLC Research Papers, p. 9. 
19 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission. 
20 Ibid, para 39. 
21 Ibid, para. 41. 
22 Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [1989] OJ L395/1. 
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“concentrations where the market share of the undertakings concerned does 
not exceed 25% either in the common market or in a substantial part of it 
are presumed to be compatible with the common market”.23  
 
Even though the scope and purpose of the Merger Regulation and Article 82 
EC are substantially different, there is no reason to believe that the concept 
of a dominant position should differ in theses two cases.24 Even up to 40%, 
the risk for a single company to be considered dominant is almost non-
existent. Very small market shares can even be a definitive indicator of a 
lack of dominance. In Metro II25 the ECJ made it quite clear that there can 
be no question of dominance where the market share is 10% or less.  
 
On the other end of the scale we have companies with very large shares of 
the market. In Hoffmann-La Roche the ECJ said that this could in itself be 
the evidence of a dominant position. However we have to keep two things in 
mind; First of all there are exceptional circumstances where large market 
shares do not necessarily mean that a firm is dominant, and secondly, the 
market share must exist for some time.26 In the AKZO judgment the ECJ 
developed its reasoning from Hoffmann-La Roche and said that a market 
share of 50% or more could be considered very large. If there are no 
exceptional circumstances, the company will be presumed to be dominant. 
The company will then have the burden to prove the opposite.27 The larger 
the market share a company has, the more likely it will be found dominant. 
When looking at market shares, it is relevant to compare the company with 
the largest share to its competitors on the market. The smaller their shares 
are, the more likely it is that the largest company will be found dominant.28
 
2.2.2.2 Super-dominance 
In Tetra Pak29 the ECJ said that the special responsibility that a dominant 
company enjoys must be considered in the light of the special circumstances 
of each case. Depending on how dominant a company is, what is found to 
be an abuse in one case might not necessarily be so in another case. The 
larger the degree of market power is, the more onerous the dominant 
company’s obligations become.30 When companies exceed 90% of the 
market they become what is called super-dominant. This means that they 
have an even larger obligation not to engage in practices such as tying, 
predatory pricing and refusal to deal. It might also be useful for the 
companies to be aware of this, since the risk that they will be considered to 
                                                 
23 Ibid, para. 15. 
24 Faull and Nikpay, p. 124. 
25 Case 75/84 Metro II [1986] ECR 3021. 
26 Whish, p. 181. 
27 Case C-62/86 AKZO v. Commission [1991] ECR I-3359. 
28 Whish, p. 182. 
29 Case C-334/94P Tetra Pak v. Commission. 
30 Whish, p. 189. 
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abuse their position is very large when they reach this amount of 
dominance.31
 
2.2.2.3 Collective dominance 
Article 82 refers to abuse by “one ore more undertakings”. This wording 
implies that the article is addressed also to several companies that hold a 
dominant position together. Three elements are required for a collective 
dominant position. First of all the undertakings that occupy the collective 
dominant position must be independent from each other. Secondly they 
must be united by economic links. And thirdly, they must hold together a 
dominant position with this economic link.32 The fact that Article 82 is 
applicable also to collective dominance, was established by the ECJ in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge.33
 
2.2.2.4 Barriers to entry 
Another important element in determining whether a company holds a 
dominant position is the existence of barriers to entering the market.  
The Commission and the Community courts have not pronounced a general 
definition of what constitutes a barrier to entry, but through their judgments 
and decisions they have adopted quite a wide approach. This has lead to the 
criticism that the market power of some undertakings has been 
exaggerated.34 On the other hand, others think that it is a broad concept, and 
should therefore include almost anything that makes it difficult for a new 
company to enter the market.35
Barriers to entry can either be costs that the company will have, such as 
legal or administrative barriers, or sunk costs of entry, which means costs 
that cannot be recovered if entering the market fails. On the other hand, 
barriers to entry are also costs that will fall on the consumers, such as a high 
cost for switching to a competitor. A final example of a barrier to entry is 
the behaviour of a firm holding a dominant position. A threat to engage in a 
price war or to expand output are examples of what can scare away new 
entrants and thereby amount to a barrier to entry.36
                                                 
31 Goyder, p. 272. 
32 Faull and Nikpay, p. 138f. 
33 Case 395/96P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v. Commission 
34 Faull and Nikpay, p. 128. 
35 Craig and De Búrca, p. 1003. 
36 Faull and Nikpay, p. 128ff. 
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3 Tying and bundling as a way 
of abusing a dominant position 
3.1 The concept of a tie-in agreement 
Article 82(d) EC states as an example of an abusive exploitation: 
 
“making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
This practice is also called tying or bundling, and can apply to both products 
and services. The essence of this practice is that the seller supplies the 
consumer with a product or service, on the condition that he or she also 
obtains something else from the seller, thereby “tying” two or more 
products together. The problem with tying, as far as competition is 
concerned, is that a company that is dominant in one market can use this 
position to strengthen its position also in another market. By leveraging its 
dominant position into this second market, the company can interfere with 
competition and create barriers to entry for other companies. 
 
Tying can take different forms. The seller can through a contract demand 
that the customer obtains the tied product in order to be supplied with the 
tying product. If the seller is dominant in this market, then the customer 
might not have the possibility to take the business somewhere else. Instead 
of forcing the customer to obtain several products, the seller can also offer a 
price reduction, which induces the customers to buy several products 
together, and hereby create an economic tie. 37 Finally products may also be 
technologically tied. In this case components are integrated in a way that 
makes it either impossible or unpractical for the consumer to separate 
them.38
 
A company in general has to be dominant in one market in order to 
successfully impose a tie. If the customers are not dependant on the 
company for the supply of a specific product, they can easily turn to another 
seller of the same product. However even if a company is dominant, not all 
tying that occurs is illegal. The concept is widespread in our society and can 
actually apply to almost everything we buy. Shoes are sold in pairs, when 
renting a room at a hotel, breakfast is often included in the price, when you 
buy a car it comes with tyres and so on. To know if a tie is illegal, the most 
important question is whether the products are separated or not.39 This 
question will be treated further under chapter 4.3. 
                                                 
37 Jones and Sufrin, p. 452f. 
38 Ahlborn, Bailey & Crossley, p. 168. 
39 Jones and Sufrin, p. 452f. 
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To better understand what a tie-in agreement really is, a more thorough 
explanation is necessary. Tying and bundling can have similar effects to 
competition, but they are in fact two different concepts. I will therefore 
separate them in this chapter for the purpose of explaining them, however in 
the rest of this analysis they will be treated together since a separation is not 
required for the purpose of my analysis. 
 
3.1.1 Pure bundling 
There are two types of bundling, pure and mixed. Pure bundling is the 
simplest case of a bundle and exists when two or more products are sold 
together only and cannot be bought separately. Furthermore they are offered 
at a fixed proportion, for example one steering wheel and four tyres as part 
of a car. This type of bundle is rare to see forced on a customer, since it is 
only natural that the market will provide what the customers want. 
Therefore, if a customer wishes to buy certain products separately, the seller 
tends to offer this, even if the price may not be very attractive. However by 
offering individual products at a sufficiently high price, in practice this 
means that they are only sold as a pure bundle.40
 
3.1.2 Mixed bundling 
In a mixed bundle the products are offered both as a package and 
individually, although if purchased together they are offered at a discount. 
The discount is crucial for an offer to be classified as a bundle. If there is no 
discount when buying the products as a package, then it is not considered to 
be a bundle. The discount can also be referred to the volume, for example if 
buying a package with two sets of a product is cheaper than buying them 
separately.41
 
3.1.3 Tying 
The term tying is used in two ways. First of all it can be a form of mixed 
bundling, or a so-called static tie. In this case, to buy product A the 
customer must also buy B. What differs this type of tie from a bundle is that 
it is possible to buy product B without also buying product A. The customer 
therefore has two possibilities: either to buy only B, or A+B as a package. 
This type of tie is achieved through exclusivity arrangements, which are 
upheld either through a contract or through technological compatibility. 
 
The second type of tying is a form of pure bundle, a dynamic tie. The way 
this tie works is that a customer who wants to purchase product A, must also 
buy product B. The difference from a bundle here is that the quantity that 
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the customer is required to buy of B differs between the customers. An 
example of a static tie can be a customer who buys a photocopy machine 
and is required to also buy the supply of papers from the same seller. 
Basically this is a way to price discriminate between customers, by charging 
different prices depending on how valuable product B is to them.42
 
 
3.2 Why bundle and tie? 
Bundling is often criticized on the grounds that it takes away the purchaser’s 
freedom of choice, it forecloses competitors, and enables companies to 
extend their monopoly into the market of the tied product.43 Economists on 
the other hand, argue that this is not always the case, and that there are 
several benefits to be achieved, both for customers and producers, by tying 
one product to another.44
 
3.2.1 Efficiency reasons 
The incentives to bundle can be separated into two groups: efficiency 
reasons and strategic reasons. Even though separated, the two tend to 
overlap and efficiency reasons can also be strategic, since the increase in 
efficiency can create a strategic advantage over the competition. There are 
several efficiency reasons for a company to bundle or tie, however the 
purpose of all of them is to reduce the costs and improve the quality.45 
Basically what a company wants is to achieve economies of scale or scope. 
One way to do this is for the company to use its resources for producing 
large volumes. By doing so, the more the company produces the cheaper 
every product will get. The same resources can also be used for different 
products, resulting in lower production costs than if the same resource 
would be used separately for both products. 
 
One of the most common reasons for tying is probably cost saving. A 
manufacturer of for example a copying machine might also sell copying 
paper, ink and spare parts. If all of these products are delivered at the same 
time to the customer, the seller might be able to reduce costs, and thereby 
lower the prices for the customers. This enables economies of scale to be 
achieved.46 Tying can also reduce costs that the customer would otherwise 
have, searching for the most appropriate combination of products to satisfy 
a complex need. Software technologies, for example, such as toolbars, 
modem support, power management and sound, used to be offered as stand-
                                                 
42 Nalebuff, 2003, p. 15f. 
43 Whish, p. 659. 
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alone products. Today they are offered as an integrated and bundled part of 
the operating system and are a response to customers demand for easier and 
bundled software.47 Another reason might be to ensure the efficiency of a 
product. The seller can therefore tie it with consumables to make sure that 
the parts that are used together are compatible. A third reason for tying is 
for the seller to be able to discriminate between the customers. A company 
faces a dilemma when setting a price for a product that has to apply to all 
customers in the market. If the price is too high, it looses customers. If on 
the other hand the price is too low, the company gives away profits from 
customers who would have been willing to pay a higher price.48 
Consequently, the seller might whish to engage in price discrimination by 
charging the customers different prices. The customers who value the 
product the highest and who needs it the most, will have to pay a higher 
price. One way to do this is to tie in a consumable. As an example the 
manufacturer of a copying-machine can tie-in photocopying paper and let 
the customers who use the machine the most pay a higher price than the 
low-volume users. This way the tie works as a substitute for putting a meter 
on the machine.49
 
3.2.2 Strategic reasons 
The strategic reasons for bundling are several and in the following section 
some of the most common ones will be presented. One strategic reason to 
bundle is to undercut rivals. When a company has rivals in the market, there 
will always be a reason to cut prices. By bundling prices the double 
marginalisation effect will be eliminated and the company can reduce its 
prices.50 Bundling can also be an effective entry-deterrent strategy for a 
company that has market power in two goods. By bundling them together 
the company can make it harder for a rival to enter the market. It also allows 
the company to defend both its products without having to price any one of 
them low.51 Bundling can also be a way to mitigate costs if another 
company enters the market. If the first company offers products A and B as 
a bundle and the second company offers only A, this can be used as a way 
for the competing firms to differentiate themselves. If both companies only 
offered product A, the profit would just be competed away. By bundling 
they can divide the market between them and attract different customers.52 
There can be competitive advantages to gain by bundling. The idea is that a 
multi-product company can offer more variety to the customers than a single 
product company. If products are sold individually in the market, the 
customers can get variety by freely mixing and matching. But if the 
products are offered as a bundle, the best way to get variety is to purchase 
the bundle. For example a ski resort can offer a bundle of several mountains 
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together in one multi-mountain pass. Another example is cable television 
companies, where the customers will look to the channel options offered by 
each company.53 Finally bundles can also be used in the game against 
consumers. It can disguise the real prices and attract consumers who 
perhaps do not always realize the relationship between the bundled price 
and the price for each product separately.54
 
 
3.3 The economic analysis of tying 
Over the years the attitude towards tying has changed a lot. With the help of 
research by economists it has developed from a quite hostile attitude where 
tying was only treated as a way to restrict competition. Today, as we have 
seen above, economists agree that there can be many pro-competitive 
reasons for companies to engage in the practice. An understanding of the 
economic effects of tying is important to understand the competition 
authorities legal approach towards the practice.  Below follows an 
explanation of how the economic approach has developed from its original 
hostile approach, via a per se legality approach, and into what it is today. 
 
3.3.1 The classical tying approach 
The economic analysis of tying can be divided into three phases, where the 
first one is the classical tying approach. This approach was based on 
leverage theories and was very hostile against tying. The basic idea of this 
theory was that the primary goal of tying was to restrict competition. A 
company with a dominant position in market A could through tying obtain a 
second dominant position in market B.55  
 
3.3.2 The Chicago school approach 
This rather simplistic approach to tying was later challenged by a new 
approach, called the Chicago school. In short the Chicago school claimed 
that tying conduct produced many benefits from a social view, at no 
competition cost, and it should therefore be treated as per se legal.56  
 
The Chicago school challenged the classical approach on two important 
points. The first one was the idea that tying first of all was anti-competitive. 
The supporters of the Chicago School argued that the underlying drive for 
tying had to be efficiencies, rather than the restriction of competition. They 
pointed to the several benefits arising from this practice, which we have 
seen in chapter 3.2 of this paper, such as reduction in production and 
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distribution costs, reduction in transaction costs, product improvement, 
quality assurance and lower prices.57  
 
The second point that was challenged was the claim that tying was 
motivated by an attempt to earn a second monopoly profit in the tied 
market. According to the supporters of the Chicago School approach, a 
company that enjoyed a monopoly in one market could not generally 
increase its profit by monopolising a second market. Instead this could lead 
to reduced profits. This idea is called “the single monopoly profit theorem” 
and according to this idea, the motivation for companies to engage in tying 
or bundling is efficiency considerations rather than the possibility to secure 
a greater profit by leveraging their monopoly from one market to another.  
 
What the single monopoly profit theorem says is that monopolists cannot 
secure greater profits by only leveraging their monopoly from one market to 
another, they must be engaged in tying and bundling to improve quality or 
lower costs.58 The single monopoly profit theorem applies to cases where 
the demands for the bundled goods are both independent and 
complementary. The meaning of an independent demand is that the quantity 
demanded by consumers of one good is independent of the price of the 
second good. If the producer ties a competitively supplied good to a 
monopolistically supplied good, it is basically the same as establishing a tax 
on the monopolistically supplied good. It will reduce consumption of the 
monopoly good unless the consumers like the tied good and it is priced 
competitively. If the demand for the two products were instead 
complementary, and the products were consumed with fixed proportions, 
then the monopolist could only profit from the tied good being 
competitively supplied, since all of the monopoly rents available in the two 
markets could be captured by a monopoly in one of these.59
 
3.3.3 Post-Chicago theories 
The Chicago school contributed to the tying doctrine by introducing the 
efficiency motivations in the antitrust analysis. It made the competition 
authorities understand that tying and bundling behaviour could be 
procompetitive by reducing cost or improving quality. However in the 
1990’s economic literature showed that the single monopoly profit theorem 
was not as correct as first assumed. In its most extreme form, the theorem 
depends on the assumption that the tied market is perfectly competitive. 
When this is not true, the theorem may fail.60  
 
The Post-Chicago economists developed a number of models to try to 
understand the competitive implications of tying and bundling when the 
structure of the tied market is oligopolistic rather than perfectly 
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competitive.61 The models that have been developed so far raise objections 
against the Chicago school’s conclusion that tying should be legal per se. 
On the other hand it does not either suggest a per se prohibition of the 
practice. Instead it establishes a theoretical possibility of anticompetitive 
tying. But it does not conclude that tying is anticompetitive in general or 
that it is likely to be anticompetitive in practice. Instead it acknowledges 
that tying can in many circumstances be welfare enhancing, including in 
situations where the single monopoly profits theorem fails.62
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4 Case law analysis 
The case law concerning tying and bundling in the EC is not very extensive, 
but there are some important cases that provide us with guidelines of how 
Article 82(d) EC has been applied by the Commission and the Community 
courts over the years. In the following chapter I will give an outline of these 
cases. It starts with a brief presentation of each case, and then a more 
thorough analysis will follow of the three most important cases, Hilti, Tetra 
Pak II and Microsoft. The grouping in this chapter is borrowed from the 
GCLC Research Papers, and is based on the nature of the tie-in agreement. 
Since I feel that it supplies a very good overview, I have chosen to use the 
same classification here. 
 
4.1 Contractual ties 
Tying practices are often imposed by contractual means. The basic idea of 
this concept is that in order to enter into a contract to buy product A, the 
customer is required to also enter into another contract for product B.63 The 
question of contractual ties has been treated in the four following cases. 
 
4.1.1 Hilti64 
The Hilti case concerned temporal tying of consumables.  
Hilti was a company that specialized in nail guns and consumables such as 
nails, cartridges and cartridge strips. They were dominant in the market for 
nail guns. Two companies, Eurofix and Bauco, turned to the Commission 
since they felt that Hilti was in breach of Article 82 EC. They were both 
small companies that specialized in supplying nails for Hilti nail guns. They 
accused Hilti of trying to exclude them form the market for nails by using a 
number of measures, one of which was tying cartridge strips and nails 
together. This practice made it difficult for other companies to sell their 
nails. Hilti argued that the motivation for this practice was concern for 
quality and safety. The argument was rejected and the Commission found 
Hilti to be in breach of art 82. Hilti appealed the decision, but both the CFI 
and the ECJ upheld the Commission’s decision. 
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4.1.2 Napier Brown/British Sugar65 
British Sugar had a monopoly in the production of beet sugar in the United 
Kingdom. Napier Brown was a merchant that bought and resold sugar. 
Napier Brown turned to the Commission alleging that British Sugar was 
using a number of abusive practices to exclude other companies from the 
market. One of these was to only offer its sugar at “delivered prices”. This 
was in fact a way of tying the supply of sugar and the delivery service 
together, and thereby excluding other delivery companies from this market. 
The Commission found this practice to be an abuse of art. 82, since it 
eliminated all competition in the delivery service of the product.  
 
In this case the Commission followed the classical per se approach in three 
steps, which was satisfied by a finding of market power, separate products 
and coercion.  There was no explicit consideration of whether the behaviour 
actually resulted in foreclosure on the tied market. The possibility of 
objective justifications was acknowledged, but did not seem to have any 
relevance in practice.66
 
4.1.3 Alsatel67 
The “tribunal de grande instance” in Strasbourg referred this case to the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling regarding the interpretation of Article 82.  
Alsatel was a company that provided telecommunications. The case 
concerned an “after sales” tying, where the customers through a contract 
were obligated to deal exclusively with Alsatel for any changes, moves, 
extensions, putting lines into service and, in general, any modifications of 
the installation. In practice that obligation meant that the customers were 
prohibited from dealing with another supplier of equipment throughout the 
duration of the contract. The question to the Court was whether, in view of 
Alsatel' s major share of the regional market, the contracts drawn up by it 
was evidence of its abuse of a dominant position. The Court said that:  
 
“Although the obligation imposed on customers to deal exclusively with the 
installer as regards any modification of the installation may be justified by 
the fact that the equipment remains the property of the installer, the fact 
that the price of the supplements to the contract entailed by those 
modifications is not determined but is unilaterally fixed by the installer and 
the automatic renewal of the contract for a 15-year term if as a result of 
those modifications the rental is increased by more than 25% may constitute 
unfair trading conditions prohibited as abusive practices by Article [82] of 
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the Treaty if all the conditions for the application of that provision are 
met.”68
 
The Court went on to say that while a very large market share may be 
important evidence for the existence of a dominant position, that factor does 
not separately indicate a dominant position, but has to be considered 
together with other factors. 
An interesting fact to note in this case is that the Court did not mention 
anything about a requirement to assess the effects of the alleged abusive 
practice.69
 
4.1.4 Tetra Pak II70 
The Tetra Pak II case is quite similar to Hilti. Elopak filed a complaint 
against Tetra Pak with the Commission for engaging in abusive trading 
practices and thereby abusing its dominant position. One of these abusive 
practices was the tying of the purchase of its carton packaging machines to 
the purchase of cartons. By doing this Tetra Pak reserved for itself the right 
to supply and repair equipment and spare parts. If the customers failed to 
comply with these conditions, Tetra Pak withheld guarantees on the 
equipment. The Commission found Tetra Pak to be in a dominant position 
and the behaviour to be abusive since it strengthened its dominant position 
on the market. Both the CFI and the ECJ upheld the decision. 
 
 
4.2 Discounts which are equivalent to tie-ins 
This practice is a form of bundled discount, where the main problem with a 
tie-in agreement is not present, namely that the customer is unable to buy 
the products separately. However in these cases the price for the bundle of 
products is set so that it would be highly uneconomical for the customer to 
buy the products separately. The consequence of this is basically a situation 
where the customer cannot choose, but is forced to buy the bundle.71 In the 
following three cases the effects of such discounts has been evaluated. 
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4.2.1 Hoffmann-La Roche72 
In Hoffmann-La Roche the case was primarily about “loyalty” discounts. 
Roche concluded agreements with their customers, which gave them 
discounts if they bought most of, or their entire, vitamin supply from Roche. 
The Commission found Roche to be in breach of Article 82, since they had a 
dominant position on the vitamin market and abused this position through 
their behaviour. 
 
The ECJ came to the same conclusion, and said that when applying fidelity 
rebates, the purpose is in fact to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions and thereby discriminate between the customers. According to 
Jones and Sufrin, the ECJ seems to suggest in its judgment that discounts 
and rebates that induce customers to buy exclusively from a dominant 
company are abuses that are prohibited per se.73 To quote the judgment; 
 
“An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties 
purchasers – even if it does so at their request – by an obligation or promise 
on their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the 
said undertaking abuses its dominant position within the meaning of article 
[82] of the Treaty, whether the obligation in question is stipulated without 
further qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the 
grant of a rebate.”74
 
In this case, the Court also took the opportunity for the first time to give a 
general definition of what constitutes “abusive conduct”75; 
 
“The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of 
an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition sill existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition.”76
 
In other words it is the conduct of an undertaking, which has such a 
dominant position that it is able to influence the market structure and 
thereby weaken competition. 
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4.2.2 Michelin77 
The Commission declared that Michelin infringed Article 82 by tying tyre 
dealers to itself through individual discounts that were based on sales 
targets. The Court of Justice disagreed on some points and said that the 
Commission had not succeeded in showing that Michelin had applied 
unequal criteria and thereby discriminated between its customers. The ECJ 
also said in the Michelin case: 
 
“A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a 
recrimination but simply means that, irrespectively of the reasons for which 
it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special 
responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the market.”78
 
It had already been said frequently that it is not illegal for a firm to enjoy a 
dominant position. However this was the first time that the ECJ spoke about 
a special responsibility for such a company. This responsibility has since 
then been repeated in several judgments.79
 
4.2.3 La Poste80 
The Belgian post operator La Poste had a monopoly over the delivery of 
business-to-private mail. The company applied preferential tariffs for this 
service, if the customers also used their business-to-business service. The 
Commission found this to be an illegal tying arrangement, since it prevented 
competitors from accessing the Belgian market for postal services that were 
not covered by the statutory monopoly. It also stated that: 
 
“A policy of tying applied by an undertaking in a monopoly position in 
order to exclude an active competitor in a neighbouring market not covered 
by the monopoly must be regarded as a very serious infringement.”81
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4.3 Technological tie-ins 
A technological tie is when a product is designed to function only together 
with the producer’s own complementary product. A product might also be 
bundled into another product and thereby included, as we shall se in the 
Microsoft case. There are legitimate reasons for this practice, such as to 
ensure the engineering of a better product. But it might also be an attempt 
from the producer to avoid competition.82 The concept of technological 
tying is quite new, and the Commission has been criticized for not having 
the technical competence to understand its effects and thereby make a 
correct assessment of such a practice. 
 
4.3.1 IBM83 
Technological tying first became a concern in the EU with the IBM case. 
IBM held a dominant position in the common market for the supply of the 
central processing unit (CPU) and the operating system for the System/370. 
As a result of this IBM could control the market for all products compatible 
with the System/370. The Commission objected to the integration of 
memory devices with the CPU and the bundling with the basic software 
applications. The case was however settled informally, since IBM agreed to 
offer its System/370 either without memory devices, or at least the 
minimum capacity required for testing. 84 Not long after the IBM case had 
been settled, the integration of the CPU and main memory devices became 
standard practice in the computer industry.85
 
4.3.2 Microsoft86 
In Microsoft the tying of Windows Media Player with Windows PC 
Operating System was found to be an abuse. The Commission decided that 
the two where separate products and by tying them together, the customers 
did not have a choice as to whether acquire WMP with the OS or not. This 
closed the market for competitors, since it put competing products at a 
disadvantage. Microsoft differs from earlier tying cases since the 
Commission at least raised the question of objective justification and thus 
abandoned the per se approach that had been applied in former cases.87
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4.4 Leading tying cases 
The approach of EC competition law towards tying is particularly shown by 
three cases: Hilti, Tetra Pak II and Microsoft. They give a good picture of 
the reasoning around tying and bundling in EC competition law by both the 
Commission and the Community courts, and they also illustrate the 
problems that exist in this area. The Commission decisions in both Hilti and 
Tetra Pak II have been criticized for treating tying as per se illegal. The 
general opinion seems to be that there is a lack of analysis of the effects of 
the alleged abuses, as well as an economic assessment. Also the question of 
objective justifications has not been seriously analyzed in the cases, neither 
by the Commission nor the Community courts. With the Microsoft decision 
however, as we shall se below, the Commission has deviated from this 
original approach and applied a different test.88
 
4.4.1 Hilti  
Hilti specialized in the manufacture and distribution of nail guns and 
cartridge strips, for which it had a patent. The company also supplied nails 
to be used in the nail guns, but these were not protected by patent. Eurofix 
and Bauco were two small companies that specialized in supplying nails 
compatible with Hilti nail guns. In 1982 they complained to the 
Commission that Hilti was infringing Article 82 of the Treaty by following 
a number of practices to ensure that customers who bought its cartridges 
also bought nails from Hilti, and not from independent suppliers. These 
practices were; refusing to provide independent dealers or distributors with 
cartridge strips unless they also bought a complement of nails; inducing its 
independent dealers to cut off the supplies of cartridge strips to independent 
nail producers; reducing discounts for customers who bought nails from 
independent nail producers; refusing to grant licences for other companies 
to manufacture or import cartridge strips. 
 
The Commission found that nail guns, cartridge strips and nails constituted 
three separate relevant product markets. This definition was based on the 
fact that from a supply view, nails and cartridge strips were produced with 
different technologies and often by different firms. Even though from a 
demand side, customers often needed both cartridge strips and nails, they 
were not necessarily purchased together and in equal quantities. Hilti’s 
policy of tying the sale of nails to its patented cartridge strips created a 
significant barrier to entry to the market for Hilti-compatible nails for other 
nail makers.89 As far as dominance was concerned, the Commission found 
that Hilti was in a dominant position in all three markets. The Commission 
also held that because of Hilti’s large market share, independent 
manufacturers of nails and cartridge strips had to manufacture products that 
were compatible with Hilti tools if they wanted to be able to achieve the 
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economies of scale necessary to be both competitive and profitable. 
Otherwise they could only produce for a small segment of the market.90 The 
Commission continued its reasoning by saying that: 
 
“In fact Hilti’s commercial behaviour /…/ is witness to its ability to act 
independently of, and without due regard to, either competitors or 
customers on the relevant markets in question. In addition, Hilti’s pricing 
policy /…/ reflects its ability to determine, or at least to have an appreciable 
influence on the conditions under which competition will develop. This 
behaviour and its economic consequences would not normally be seen 
where a company was facing real competitive pressure.”91  
 
Hilti tried to justify its commercial behaviour by referring to safety reasons, 
saying that nails made by certain independent nail makers did not meet the 
desired standard. The actions taken were therefore motivated by the desire 
to ensure the safe and reliable operation of its products, and not a method to 
reach a commercial advantage. The Commission rejected this and pointed 
out that Hilti had never taken any appropriate measures to come to terms 
with these safety concerns. Therefore its argument concerning safety was 
not considered an objective justification for its behaviour.92  
 
Hilti appealed to the CFI, on the grounds that it did not hold a dominant 
position and that its behaviour was objectively justified, but without 
success. For the question of the relevant product market, the CFI agreed 
with the Commission and said that nail guns, cartridge strips and nails 
constituted three specific markets. As the Commission, it pointed to the fact 
that there are independent producers of nails, and also of nails for use in nail 
guns.93 The CFI said that considering nail guns, cartridge strips and nails as 
forming an invisible whole “is in practice tantamount to permitting 
producers of nail guns to exclude the use of consumables other than their 
own branded products in their tools”94.  
 
According to Dolmans and Graf the Court’s statement means that if there is 
a demand to acquire the tied product from a different source than the tying 
product, the dominant company is obligated to give its customers the choice 
to do so. This is irrespective of whether the products are complements to 
each other, or connected in some way by a natural link or commercial 
usage.95 Rousseva has also commented on the CFI’s statement. She is quite 
critical towards it since she feels that this would in fact suggest that 
products cannot be sold jointly by a dominant undertaking even if they are 
linked by nature or by their commercial usage.96  
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Regarding the question of whether Hilti held a dominant position on the 
market for nails, it had been proved by the Commission that Hilti had a 
market share of around 70% to 80% in the relevant market for nails. The 
CFI referred to the judgment in AKZO, where it was established that such a 
market share in itself is a clear indication of a dominant position, and 
consequently found no reason to deviate from the Commission’s view that 
Hilti was dominant in the market for nails.97 Lastly the CFI stated that 
Hilti’s argument for objective justification could not be accepted on the 
same grounds as were referred to by the Commission. Hilti had at no time 
approached the authorities for a ruling that the use of other manufacturer’s 
nails in Hilti tools was dangerous.98 Hilti’s appeal was therefore rejected by 
the CFI. Also the ECJ upheld the Commission’s decision. 
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4.4.2 Tetra Pak II 
In 1983 Elopak filed a complaint with the Commission against Tetra Pak, a 
manufacturer of machines for packaging liquid and semi-liquid foods in 
cartons, for engaging in trading practices which were abusive for a company 
in a dominant position. The abusive practices were; the tying of the 
purchase of its carton packaging machines to the purchase of cartons, 
requiring purchasers to use only Tetra Pak’s maintenance and repair 
services, and withholding guarantees on the equipment if the purchasers 
failed to comply with these conditions. 
 
Tetra Pak tried to defend itself by claiming that by its nature and 
commercial usage, the machines, the packaging, the cartons and the service 
were part of an indivisible whole. Tetra Pak also said that in any event the 
tying of the machines and cartons was justified for technical reasons, 
considerations of product liability and health, and by the need to protect its 
reputation. The high technology of its machines demanded that only 
specifically designed cartons were used in them. Because of this, a “natural 
link” existed between the machines and the cartons, and thus there could be 
no breach of Article 82. 
 
There are two main issues in Tetra Pak II: 
 
1. the issue of dominance in the aseptic markets as well as the non-
aseptic markets and; 
2. whether the machines and the cartons form separate markets. 
 
On the issue of the relevant market, the Commission came to a different 
conclusion than Tetra Pak and identified four separate relevant markets: 
aseptic packaging machines, aseptic cartons, non-aseptic packaging 
machines and non-aseptic cartons. To support its definition it said; 
 
“/.../although types of packaging as diverse as glass bottles, plastic bottles, 
plastic bags, metal tins, aseptic cartons, non-aseptic cartons, etc., form part 
of what is commonly known in the broad sense of the term as the packaging 
market for the liquid foods, this is not the “relevant market” within the 
meaning of Article [82], since these different types of packaging compete 
with each other only in the long term. In the short, and probably even the 
medium term, the conditions of supply and demand are such that the 
elasticity of substitution for products in relation to prices is almost zero.”99  
 
On the aseptic market Tetra Pak held a very strong, almost monopolistic 
position with market shares of around 90% for both machines and cartons. 
However on the non-aseptic market the position was much weaker with 
market shares that, at the most, only amounted to around 50%. In some 
countries it was even as low as 30%. There was no doubt that Tetra Pak was 
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dominant on the aseptic markets. On the other hand, when assessing its 
position on the non-aseptic markets, the Commission could not come to the 
same conclusion and consequently said the following: 
 
“Even though it cannot therefore be considered that Tetra Pak enjoys a 
position on the non-aseptic markets which allows it to behave as 
independently as on the aseptic markets, it is certain that it is far less 
affected by market forces than any of its competitors.”100
 
The Commission continued and said that on the non-aseptic markets the 
existence of a dominant position was less clear-cut if considered in 
isolation. Still, it said that the ECJ has recognized market shares smaller 
than in this case, as constituting a dominant position. It also said that the 
market shares in some of the Member States were such that undoubtedly a 
dominant position existed, even if the markets were considered in 
isolation.101 Finally it said in the conclusion; 
 
“The Commission takes the view that, by taking advantage of its dominant 
and virtually monopolistic position on the so-called aseptic markets in 
machines and cartons intended for the packaging of liquid foodstuffs, Tetra 
Pak has committed and continues to commit abuses within the meaning of 
Article [82], both on these aseptic markets and on the neighbouring markets 
in non-aseptic equipment and cartons.”102
 
Tetra Pak appealed to both the CFI and the ECJ, claiming that it did not 
have a dominant position in the common market or a substantial part of it, 
and that its conduct did not constitute an abuse within the meaning of 
Article 82. Both courts upheld the Commission’s decision.  The CFI said in 
its judgment; 
 
“It follows from all the above considerations that, in the circumstances of 
this case, Tetra Pak’s practices on the non-aseptic markets are liable to be 
caught by Article [82] of the Treaty without its being necessary to establish 
the existence of a dominant position on those markets taken in isolation, 
since that undertaking’s leading position on the non-aseptic markets, 
combined with the close associative links between those markets and the 
aseptic markets, gave Tetra Pak freedom of conduct compared with the 
other economic operators on the non-aseptic markets, such as to impose on 
it a special responsibility under Article [82] to maintain genuine undistorted 
competition on those markets.”103
 
Applying Article 82 to a case with distinct markets, where the abuse is 
taking place on the non-dominant market and producing effects on the 
neighbouring dominant market, can only be justified by special 
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circumstances. The circumstances taken into account by the CFI were the 
following: Tetra Pak held 78% of the overall market in packaging in both 
aseptic and non-aseptic cartons, which was more than seven times more 
than its closest competitor.104 Tetra Pak was also the leading company in the 
non-aseptic sector.105 Furthermore Tetra Pak’s quasi-monopolistic position 
on the aseptic markets made it the favoured supplier of non-aseptic 
systems.106 Lastly the CFI concluded that because of the situations on the 
different markets and the close associative links between them, the 
application of Article 82 was justified.107 These circumstances were upheld 
by the Court of Justice, who also said that given Tetra Pak’s almost 
complete domination of the aseptic markets, the company could also count 
on a favoured status on the non-aseptic markets, and thereby it could 
concentrate its efforts on the non-aseptic market by acting independently of 
the other economic operators.108
 
The Commission does not really establish a dominant position in the non-
aseptic market in its decision. Instead it seems to be saying that a non-
dominant company’s conduct on a market can be caught as an abuse, if the 
company is dominant in another, separate but neighbouring, market.109 
From AKZO we have learned that market shares of 50% and more should be 
taken as an indication of a very strong position on the market.110 In this case 
it seems as though the Commission has let the super dominant position in 
the aseptic market rub off on the non-aseptic market. The reasoning of the 
Commission in this part of its decision has been quite criticized in the 
doctrine by various authors. Korah says that the Commission relied in its 
decision on the associative links between the aseptic and the non-aseptic 
markets, in order to condemn conduct on the non-aseptic markets that 
actually had effect only on the non-aseptic markets.111  
 
Levy discusses the fact that Tetra Pak was found to be infringing Article 82 
in the non-aseptic market where it was not dominant, and what effects this 
will have. He comes to the conclusion that the scope of the Tetra Pak II 
judgment is quite limited for five reasons. First of all the abusive conduct 
was practiced on a product market neighbouring the market of dominance. 
Second, there were close links between the two markets. Third, Tetra Pak 
was active on both markets, and on the market where it was not dominant it 
still had a much stronger position than any of its rivals. Fourth, a large 
amount of Tetra Pak’s customers operated on both markets. Fifth, since 
Tetra Pak was dominant on the aseptic market, it could focus its competitive 
efforts on the neighbouring, non-aseptic market. He concludes that these 
factors together should only occur very rarely. Therefore the judgment in 
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Tetra Pak II should only in exceptional circumstances prevent a company 
with a dominant position in one market, from competing aggressively on 
another market. Especially when the other market is unrelated.112
 
As far as concerns the tying of the machines and cartons, Tetra Pak argued 
that this practice was justified in the light of commercial usage and the 
nature of the products. The Commission on the other hand held the opposite, 
and both Community Courts agreed. This finding was based on the fact that 
there were independent manufacturers who specialized in manufacturing 
cartons for use in machines manufactured by others. The CFI said that tied 
sales of machinery and cartons were not in accordance with commercial 
usage, since such sales were not a general rule in neither the aseptic nor the 
non-aseptic sector.113 These factors were taken as an indication that the two 
products were separate. Even if commercial usage could be shown it was 
not enough to justify a tying by an undertaking in a dominant position, the 
CFI said, since “even a usage which is acceptable in a normal situation, on 
a competitive market, cannot be accepted in the case of a market where 
competition is already restricted.”114 The ECJ upheld the CFI’s reasoning 
also in this part of the appeal, by stating that the list of abusive practices in 
Article 82 was not exhaustive, and so:  
 
“Consequently, even where tied sales of two products are in accordance 
with commercial usage or there is a natural link between the two products 
in question, such sales may still constitute abuse within the meaning of 
Article [82] unless they are objectively justified.”115
 
Korah criticizes the Commission’s decision, as well as the judgments of the 
Courts for lack of reasoning. The conclusions may have been right, she says, 
but it is concerning that neither of them have considered the objections to or 
commercial justifications for a tie, or whether it was proportionate. It is true 
that the list of potentially abusive practices in Article 82 is not exhaustive. 
Still, in this case the Court extended Article 82 to tying products that were 
not dominated, without giving any reason. The Court simply referred to the 
CFI’s observation that there were independent suppliers of non-aseptic 
cartons and that the list in Article 82 was not exhaustive.116
 
Rousseva comments on the separate-product test in Tetra Pak II, and 
whether the tying was justified. If the products sold together are not in 
different product markets there is no tying at all. On the other hand she 
points out that the text of Article 82 does not say that the finding that the 
products are distinct is an indication of abuse. Still, the Commission and the 
Community Courts’ analyses tend to be limited to the carrying out of this 
test.  
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“Commercial or efficiency explanations for joint sales of distinct products 
have not been accepted where the supplier is in a dominant position”, she 
says.117  
 
In Tetra Pak II it was obvious that there was a demand for the tied products 
since they were complementary. What we can learn from Tetra Pak II 
according to Rousseva is that an existing demand for using two products 
together is not enough to justify a tie, as long as there is also a demand for 
purchasing the tied products separately from different suppliers or in 
different quantities.118
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4.4.3 Microsoft 
In 1998 Sun Microsystems made an application to the Commission for the 
initiation of proceedings against Microsoft. According to Sun 
Microsystems, Microsoft held a dominant position as a supplier of PC 
operating systems. By reserving for itself information that was necessary to 
create software products that could interoperate with the PC operating 
systems, Microsoft infringed Article 82 of the Treaty. Following this 
application, the Commission launched an investigation against Microsoft 
that especially concerned the incorporation of a software product called 
“Windows Media Player” (WMP) into its PC operating system.119 This 
tying practice was found to be an abuse of Article 82 (d) and Microsoft was 
fined € 497 million by the Commission. In addition to this, Microsoft was 
required to provide its customers with a version of its operating system 
without WMP. 
 
In the decision four conditions were set up by the Commission for a tie to be 
prohibited under Article 82 EC: 1) the undertaking concerned should be 
dominant in the tying product market; 2) the tying and tied goods should be 
two separate products; 3) the undertaking concerned should not give 
customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product; and 
4) the tying should foreclose competition.120
 
Microsoft did not contest the fact that it held a dominant position in the 
market for operating systems for PC’s. The Commission referred to AG 
Fennelly’s statement from Compagnie Maritime Belge, where he talked 
about the concept of “superdominance” and stressed the special 
responsibility that a company in a position of overwhelming dominance has: 
 
“Microsoft, with its market shares of over 90%, occupies almost the whole 
market – it therefore approaches a position of complete monopoly, and can 
be said to hold an overwhelmingly dominant position.”121
 
For the purpose of defining the relevant product market, the Commission 
started by saying that: “A relevant product market comprises all those 
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, 
their prices and their intended use/.../.”122
 
The Commission then came to the conclusion that the markets for the client 
PC operating systems and the one for streaming media players were two 
separate ones. The existence of stand-alone media player software that can 
be installed on a PC was seen as a proof of this fact. 
                                                 
119 Commission decision of 24 March 2004, Microsoft, para. 3-5. 
120 Ibid, para. 794. 
121 Ibid, para. 435. 
122 Ibid, para. 321. 
 35
Microsoft contested this and argued that client PC’s would not be shipped 
without the multimedia function of playing audio and video content.123 The 
Commission rejected the objection. 
 
As for the question of abuse, the Commission referred to the ECJ’s 
judgment in Michelin and said that a dominant position is not in itself an 
abuse of the competition rules. Nevertheless, it brings about a special 
responsibility not to engage in conduct that may distort competition.124
 
The Commission devoted quite some time in its decision analysing the 
Article 82 requirement, that purchasers are forced to acquire the tied product 
along with the tying product. In its defence, Microsoft argued that in fact 
WMP was given away for free with the operative system. The Commission 
did not accept this argument on the grounds that a fee for the WMP could be 
hidden in the bundled price. It also said that that in any event this was 
immaterial, since the main concern was the foreclosure effects. By tying 
WMP with Windows, Microsoft took advantage of its dominant position in 
this market. The WMP was built into the PC before being delivered to the 
end customer, and Microsoft did not provide for any means to remove it. 
Hereby the customers were deprived of their choice as to whether acquire 
the WMP or not. 
 
The Commission decision argues that because of Microsoft’s dominance on 
the market with Windows OS, the bundling of WMP will give it such an 
advantage over other media player manufacturers that they will not be able 
to compete. If WMP becomes the industry standard, content providers and 
software developers will increasingly produce content exclusively in WMP 
format and as a result competing products will be driven out of the market. 
Along with this comes the fear that Microsoft will acquire control over other 
related markets, such as media delivery software and digital rights 
management technology.125
 
Völcker notes in his examination of the judgment, that the Commission has 
analyzed both the actual and the projected foreclosure effects of Microsoft’s 
behaviour. This might, in his opinion, be a way to avoid that the CFI takes a 
different approach in an appeal considering the specifics of the software 
industry. Another remark made by Völcker is that although the Commission 
rejects the efficiency defences made by Microsoft, it still makes a very 
thorough examination of the arguments put forward by the company. He 
says that maybe this is also an attempt to make the decision appeal-proof. 
Another possible explanation is that the Commission has decided to at least 
be open to efficiency justifications in Article 82 cases.126
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The decision in the Microsoft case has been subject to several comments in 
the doctrine, not just by Völcker, and has put new fuel into the debate on the 
subject of tying and Article 82(2)(d) EC.  Not everyone questions the 
Commission’s reasoning in the case. Some authors think that the 
Commission has acted correctly in its decision.  
 
According to Dolmans and Graf the Microsoft decision is a textbook case 
for a tying abuse.127 Based on the case law of the Commission and the ECJ, 
they have identified five elements that need to be fulfilled in order to 
establish a tying abuse under Article 82(2)(d) EC: dominance of the seller in 
the market for the tying product; existence of a tied product that is separate 
from the tying product; coercion, meaning that the customers are forced to 
buy the tied product together with the tying product; a restrictive effect on 
competition for the tied product; and absence of an objective and 
proportionate justification for the coercion. 128
 
They find all of these conditions to be fulfilled in the Commission decision. 
As for the effect on competition, they say that there is an interdependency 
between all the different elements in the digital distribution chain, and the 
demand for each element in the chain is influenced by the usage of other 
elements in the chain. Microsoft’s tying had the effect of distorting these 
network effects to the company’s advantage.129
 
Evans and Padilla disagree with Dolmans and Graf. They attack the 
Commission’s decision on two relevant points. The first one is the 
acknowledgement by the Commission that Microsoft’s practice did not in 
fact lead to a classical tying case, where foreclosure is a result of the fact 
that consumers would take a competing product if they were given the 
choice to do so. Instead foreclosure is a result of content providers 
standardising on WMP and thereby forcing customers to use it, since 
eventually content will be available only for WMP. The problem in the 
Commission’s view, they say, is that Microsoft has an advantage in 
distributing its technology that others do not have. However they do not see 
how the standard remedy for tying would solve this problem, since almost 
all computer manufacturers and consumers most likely will continue to 
chose the version of Windows that includes WMP.130
 
The second interesting point of criticism from Evans and Padilla concerns 
the separate products test used by the Commission in its decision. The test 
says that AB is not a single product if there is a market for B separately. On 
this ground PC OS and WMP were found to be separate products, since 
there are independent manufacturers of media players. Evans and Padilla 
argue that with this application of the test there are bound to be absurd 
results. They present several examples of products that we do not see as 
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separate products, such as shoes with laces, mobile phones with SIM cards, 
computers with hard drives etc. They say that every product for which there 
is an aftermarket with spare parts would be defined as separate products 
rather than one single product with this analysis. In their view the 
Commission appears to be applying an extension of tying law to a large 
amount of products that are built from different components or based on 
technological integration of new features.131
 
Furthermore also Pardolesi and Renda are sceptic towards the 
Commission’s approach. When investigating the different conditions for an 
illegal tie under Article 82(2)(d) they find that the foreclosure effect is hard 
to prove. They particularly question the Commission’s claim that Microsoft 
could rule out competitors just by integrating WMP in its OS, since there 
are many ways for a competitor to bring a media player to the market. The 
most common one seem to be direct download from the Web, where it only 
takes a few minutes to download. Most users also keep more than one media 
player on their computer, since it only takes up negligible space on the hard 
disk. Moreover the existing media players support different formats. To 
stream an audiovisual file, a special media player might be required. 
However if the user does not have this particular media player it can easily 
be downloaded from the Web and streaming will then be possible. It is one 
of the reasons why most users end up with more than one media player on 
their computer. This practice shows that commercial agreements between 
the producers of media players and the content producers are the key for a 
media players commercial success. Following this reasoning, Pardolesi and 
Renda find it difficult to imagine that Microsoft’s tying conduct would have 
the effect of actually determining competitors’ exit from the market.132 
Finally they find it worrying that the Commission has not treated the issue 
of consumer harm in the decision, and that a technological integration case 
has been treated exactly as an old-fashioned tying claim.133
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5 The EC tying approach 
There are different approaches to take for competition authorities when 
making a legal analysis of a practice, such as tying. The per se approach 
includes both per se prohibition and per se legality. Per se prohibition is 
reserved for conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive and amount to nearly 
absolute prohibitions. Per se legality means that tying will automatically be 
regarded as legal provided that certain criteria are satisfied. These rules are 
normally reserved for those situations where economic theory and 
experience indicate that the risk of harming competition is so rare that it is 
unnecessary to weigh the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of 
the conduct against each other. The modified per se approach is an 
extension of this first approach, and is used in those cases where a simple 
assessment of the market has been done. The rule of reason approach 
means that the legality is determined through a case-by-case application. All 
of the circumstances in a case are examined before deciding whether a tie 
should be prohibited because it imposes an unreasonable constraint on 
competition, or permitted on account of its beneficial effects.134
 
The case law shows that the Commission has been quite hostile towards 
tying because of its concern that other companies might be excluded from 
the market. It fears that a tie will enable a company that is dominant in one 
market, to extend its market power into a second market and thereby 
exclude other companies from the second market.135 The economics of ties 
and monopoly profits are complex and neither the Commission nor the 
Courts have really addressed the issue. Arguments about systems and 
quality have been dismissed and their policy seems to have been more about 
the protection of small firms and competitors, rather than efficiency and free 
competition.136
 
 
5.1 From per se approach… 
Prior to the Microsoft case, the Commission and the European Courts have 
consistently applied a per se prohibition approach to tying, without ever 
really considering whether the tying in question was actually harmful for 
consumers. It appears as though they have been focusing on the form when 
assessing tying arrangements, rather than the effects of the practice.137 
Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla present two possible reasons why tying has been 
treated as per se prohibited for so long in the EC. The first one is that it has 
taken longer for new developments in economic theory to affect competition 
policy. The old pre-Chicago school considerations still rule, even though 
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they are sometimes presented as post-Chicago reasoning. The second reason 
is the “special responsibility” that EC competition law imposes on dominant 
companies, not to allow their conduct to impair undistorted competition. 
This makes the finding of an abuse easier, in particular where a dominant 
company has an efficient behaviour, and no assessment to find out the 
effects of the dominant company’s behaviour seems to be necessary.138 The 
test that has been applied in the per se approach has been a three-step test, 
where a finding of: (1) market power, (2) separate products and  
(3) coercion has been enough for a tying practice to be abusive. 
 
Dominance in the market for the tying product has been established in all 
tying cases as we have seen earlier in this paper. One criticism however, and 
perhaps an explanation for this, is that in some of the cases the market has 
been defined so narrowly that a finding of dominance was inevitable.139 
This was the case in for example Hilti, were Hilti-compatible nails were 
found to be a separate market. 
 
In all tying cases there has been a tendency to focus on whether the products 
supplied together are separate or not. That the products are separate is a 
prerequisite for a tying to exist, still it does not automatically mean that it is 
an abuse. Even so, the Commission’s and the Community courts’ analyses 
has been limited to this separate products test. Commercial or efficiency 
explanations have not been accepted, as we have seen in both Hilti and 
Tetra Pak II. What follows from those cases is that as long as there is a 
demand for acquiring products separately, a demand for using the products 
together is not sufficient to justify a tie.140 Once it is shown that the 
products or services that are tied together are in different markets, a 
dominant undertaking cannot rely on the words about nature and 
commercial usage in Article 82 (d).141
 
In both Hilti and Tetra Pak II the element of coercion was satisfied by the 
establishment that the policies by the dominant companies, or the 
contractual obligations, left the customers without a choice as to their 
sources when acquiring products.142  
 
Economists agree that tying in many cases can be pro-competitive. 
Therefore the per se prohibition that has been applied in the EC for so long 
seems inappropriate.143
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5.2 …to rule of reason 
The rule of reason approach has been promoted by leading scholars in both 
economy and competition law for a long time. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla 
deliver a number of arguments in favour of this approach. First of all they 
argue that since tying is so common in competitive markets, it must provide 
efficiencies. Secondly, even though anticompetitive effects can occur under 
certain circumstances, market dominance is just one of the necessary 
conditions. Thirdly they say that no economic theory finds that market 
power or dominance is a sufficient condition on its own, for a tying to have 
anticompetitive effects. Fourthly, a factual analysis must be made to 
determine if a tying has anticompetitive effects. Economic theory only says 
that tying might be anticompetitive. Fifthly, a factual analysis must also be 
made to determine if a tying has pro-competitive effects, since also in this 
aspect economic theory only says that tying might be efficient. And at last, a 
rule of reason analysis is the appropriate framework for conducting the 
factual analysis described in the above points.144
 
Also the EAGCP group find the per se approach inadequate. In their report 
they argue in favour of a more economics-based approach to Article 82, and 
say that such an approach will naturally lend itself to a rule of reason 
approach to competition policy. This follows since careful considerations of 
the specifics of each case are needed, and such a requirement can hardly be 
satisfied under per se rules.145
 
After consistently applying a per se prohibition, it seems as though with the 
Microsoft case the Commission has changed its analytical framework 
somewhat and abandoned the outdated approach. A different test, consisting 
of four steps, was applied when the Commission delivered its decision.146 
The new test formulated by the Commission consisted of (1) dominance, (2) 
separate products, (3) coercion and (4) foreclosure.  
 
Despite this new test though, the position in Microsoft is basically the same 
as in earlier cases. What differs is that the Commission made an extensive 
examination of the actual foreclosure effects resulting from Microsoft’s 
behaviour and also considered the efficiency defences put forward by the 
company.147 This suggests that a rule of reason approach was applied in the 
case. The introduction of the foreclosure requirement indicates that the 
Commission felt that a more extensive analysis was required in this case. It 
also stated in its decision that there were circumstances in the specific case 
that made it necessary to examine the effects that the tying of WMP had on 
competition. In earlier, classical tying cases, the foreclosure effect has been 
considered satisfied only by demonstrating the bundling of a separate 
product with a dominant product. In this case the circumstances were 
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somewhat different since the customers had the possibility to download 
media players for free. Therefore the Commission concluded that the 
practice had to be analysed further to see whether it would actually 
foreclose competition.148
 
Still, a problem with comparing Microsoft with the earlier tying cases is that 
it deals with technological integration. The Commission decision does not 
tell us whether the four-step test applied is intended for all tying cases or 
just the ones that regard technological tying. This makes the new rule of 
reason approach quite unstable still, and it remains to be seen if the 
Commission and the Courts will revert to a per se prohibition approach.149
 
 
5.3 Objective justifications 
Objective justifications have been raised by the dominant companies in 
several cases, without any success. Hilti referred to safety reasons, saying 
that independent nail makers did not meet the desired standard. Tetra Pak 
argued that the tying of the machines and cartons was justified by 
commercial usage and the nature of the products. Neither of these objections 
were accepted, and therefore it has been questioned whether a company can 
ever have success in arguing objective justifications in a tying case. Due to 
the small number of tying cases in the EC it is difficult to say whether the 
threshold for an objective justification is particularly high, or whether in the 
few cases where justifications have been put forward by dominant 
companies, they simply have not been supported by facts.150  
 
In Microsoft the Commission for the first time analysed thoroughly the 
justifications made by the dominant company, even though in the end they 
were rejected. It appears as the Commission in this case tried to show that 
tying is capable of objective justification. It seems to follow from the 
Microsoft judgment that a dominant undertaking must show that the tying 
arrangement in question is indispensable for it to compete on the merits, and 
as a result it is in fact pro-competitive.151  
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5.4 Economic reasoning 
The rule of reason approach goes hand in hand with the economics-based 
approach towards Article 82 that so many critics call for. The authors of the 
EAGCP Report argue that such an approach focuses on improved consumer 
welfare, and as a result it avoids confusing the protection of competition 
with the protection of competitors. A careful examination of how 
competition works in each particular market is necessary in order to 
evaluate how specific company strategies affect consumer welfare.152 
Depending on the nature of competition and the market, bundling can have 
exclusionary effects or pro-competitive effects and should therefore be 
analyzed in the light of the practice.153
 
After many years of debating this lack, the Commission decided to 
investigate and reform the application of Article 82. Neelie Kroes 
emphasized in her speech in 2005 that the objective of Article 82 is the 
protection of competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer 
welfare. She also talked about the importance of a foreclosure effect as a 
result of a dominant company’s behaviour, and that this foreclosure should 
be market distorting and not only affect one or two competitors.154
 
                                                 
152 Report by the EAGCP, p. 2. 
153 Ibid, p. 41. 
154 Speech by Neelie Kroes at Fordham in 2005. 
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6 The Commission’s 
discussion paper 
In December 2005 the “DG Competition discussion paper on the application 
of Article 82 EC to exclusionary abuses”, hereafter called “the discussion 
paper”, was issued. The discussion paper has no legal value but is a way for 
the Commission to communicate how the rules should be interpreted. 
 
The discussion paper starts by defining the concept of market definition and 
dominance. Thereafter it moves on to discuss different categories of 
exclusionary abuses, and this is where tying and bundling is treated. First of 
all a definition of tying and bundling is presented, as well as the possible 
anticompetitive effects that the practice can have. Foreclosure, price 
discrimination and higher prices are mentioned. Then four points are set up, 
demonstrating the elements that are usually required for a practice to be 
prohibited under Article 82(d): 1) the company concerned is dominant in the 
tying market; 2) the tying and the tied goods are two distinct products; 3) 
the tying practice is likely to have a market distorting foreclosure effect; 4) 
the tying practice is not justified objectively or by efficiencies.155
 
The Discussion paper is, to a significant extent, a restatement of the case 
law of the Community courts and the Commission. It is not the radical move 
towards a more economics-based approach that some might have 
expected.156
 
One thing that is new though, is that the discussion paper introduces a new 
form of tying, called technical tying, which occurs when the tied product is 
technically integrated in the tying product. Surely the Commission has been 
influenced by the Microsoft case, and feels a need to define this new 
phenomenon in the discussion paper. Akman sees a problem with this new 
concept, since it will be even harder to prove that two products that are 
physically integrated are in fact two separate products. It is also noted in the 
discussion paper that the customers’ demand should determine whether or 
not two products are distinct. A difficulty with this could be that when a 
new product is introduced with integrated features, it will be impossible to 
know whether there would be a demand for these features separately. Also, 
it is worth noting that such an integration of different features could be seen 
as a natural or commercial link between the tied products and they would 
therefore fall outside the scope of Article 82(d). Based on this assessment 
the conclusion can be drawn that the approach from Tetra Pak II, that even a 
natural link or a commercial usage is not always  enough to escape the tying 
prohibition in Article 82(d), is being reinforced 157  
                                                 
155 DG Competition discussion paper, p. 55. 
156 Völcker 2006, p. 1428. 
157 Akman, p. 827. 
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Since the Discussion Paper was issued the public has now had the 
opportunity to comment on it. Both bigger law firms and companies has 
ventilated their views on the Commission’s approach and these comments 
can now be found on the EU web page. Currently the Commission is 
reflecting on these comments and it has been said that further steps are to be 
expected in early 2007. However now it is April and no news has been 
reported so far. What the next step in the reformation of Article 82 will be is 
therefore unknown. It has been said that the purpose of the discussion paper 
is to revise the application of the article. Still no such signs can really be 
found in the Discussion Paper and therefore it remains to be seen what will 
come of it. Hopefully the Commission has taken note of the debate that has 
surrounded the tying cases over the last years, and the theories put forward 
by the Post-Chicago economists. This should in turn bring about a 
development towards a rule of reason approach and a case-by-case analysis 
where the special circumstances in each tying case are considered before a 
tying abuse is condemned abusive. 
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7 Analysis and concluding 
remarks 
During the course of this paper I have tried to find the answers to three 
different questions relating to tying and Article 82(d). The first one is 
whether there is a clear and coherent approach towards tying in the EC. One 
of the difficulties when making this assessment is the fact that the case law 
on tying in the EC is not very extensive. Still, after having studied the few 
tying cases that exists, and in particular Hilti and Tetra Pak II, the approach 
by both the Commission and the Community courts seems quite obvious to 
me. In both these cases a three-step test has been applied. A finding of 
market power, separate products and coercion has been enough to find a tie 
abusive. The actual effects of the tie in question have not been investigated 
and in the cases where justifications have been raised these have generally 
been dismissed without much discussion. These factors together have 
suggested that tying has been per se prohibited in the EC, an approach that 
has been criticized by many commentators. Economists have stressed that 
tying actually is pro-competitive in many cases and therefore it would be 
more appropriate with a case to case analysis to decide whether a tying 
practice should be allowed or not. 
 
However with the Microsoft decision the Commission seemed to be shifting 
its positions somewhat as a new test was applied. The Commission declared 
that dominance, separate products, coercion and foreclosure were the 
necessary elements for a tying practice to be found abusive. From a quite 
consistent per se illegality approach, the Commission now seems to 
consider the actual effects of the practice. The advantages that Microsoft 
would gain from integrating WMP into its operating system were analysed 
and considered so great that other media player manufacturers would not be 
able to compete and therefore driven out of the market. Whether this is a 
correct analysis or not can be discussed and here the opinions go apart. Still, 
the main point of this decision is rather that the Commission has actually 
focused on the effects of Microsoft’s behaviour, which it has not done in 
earlier cases. Some commentators mean that this is an indication of a 
movement towards a more effects-based approach towards tying, meaning 
that the so criticized per se illegality approach has been abandoned for a 
rule of reason approach. Whether this is correct however, cannot be 
answered at this point, considering the special circumstances in the 
Microsoft case. It concerned technological tying and therefore some authors 
have argued that maybe the new approach is only valid in those special 
cases. Based on this I would say that the tying approach in the EC is at the 
moment rather unclear. It is possible that the debate around the outdated per 
se illegality has finally sunk in with the Commission but this remains to be 
seen with future tying decisions. Also the judgments from the CFI and 
possibly the ECJ might shed some light on this question. 
 
 46
My second question is how tying should be treated in the context of Article 
82(d). When studying the case law I find it pretty obvious that both the 
Commission and the Community courts have treated tying with hostility, 
since in most cases it has been found to be illegal. The critique that has been 
brought against the view on tying in the EC is mostly based on the lack of 
both an economic perspective and the lack of an assessment of the 
consequences of the tying practice. Economists agree that tying in many 
situations can be good for competition. Certain tying practices can however 
also be anti-competitive, but this has to do with whether they foreclose other 
companies from the product market and thereby ultimately cause harm for 
competition. Another critique that has been brought against the tying policy 
in the EC is that the original subject for protection in the paragraph, the 
customer, has been put out of focus. Instead the companies and whether 
they are being foreclosed from the market is now the focus of protection.  
 
Historically the authorities have had a tendency to look at tying only as a 
method to restrict competition. It has therefore been viewed as something 
that harms the consumers. However with the economic research that has 
been done, the attitude has changed over the last years. The Post-Chicago 
theories show that several efficiency reasons can be achieved through tying 
and bundling. The motives for companies to engage in the practice is not so 
much to restrict competition, but rather to save money and increase 
efficiency. The fact that so many companies engage in tying practices also 
indicates that it provides a lot of efficiencies. These circumstances make the 
per se approach inadequate when assessing tying practices, since it is a tool 
that is reserved for practices that are subject to absolute prohibitions. Under 
this approach all tying practices will be treated the same and focus will be 
on the form of the practice, not what the actual effects on competition are. 
 
The fact that a tie can be both good and bad for competition suggests that it 
would be more suitable to look at the effects of the practice. The rule of 
reason approach would be a far better tool for this, since it separates the 
pro-competitive and anti-competitive practices from each other. It will also 
force the authorities to involve an economic reasoning when they evaluate 
individual cases. By using this approach, companies would be offered the 
ability to compete and at the same time competition in the Community 
would be protected since the tying practices that were actually harmful for 
competition would be detected and stopped. The Commission’s reasoning in 
the Microsoft case is one step on the right way towards such a rule of 
reason approach, even though we still do not know what will be the 
consequences of that decision in the long run. 
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Another indication that the EC is moving towards a rule of reason approach 
is the Commission’s discussion paper. Neelie Kroes said in her speech at 
Fordham that “/../the exercise of market power must be assessed essentially 
on the basis of its effects in the market”.158 She also said that aggressive 
competition is good, also by dominant companies. It is all right if it hurts 
competitors, as long as it ultimately benefits the consumers.159  
 
This discussion paper is, apart from the Commission’s shift in attitude in 
Microsoft, another big change for tying law. The paper was issued in 2006 
as a result of the debate that has surrounded the application of Article 82 
during the last years. It is now time for a reform of the article, in the 
footsteps of the reformation of Article 81, and the expectations have been 
high. In her speech, Neelie Kroes marked that a shift towards a more effects 
based competition policy was necessary and that Article 82 should be used 
to protect the consumers. This indicates an abandonment of the per se 
illegality view on such practices as tying. Still, the approach taken in the 
discussion paper is not as radical as was hoped. It does not take a clear stand 
in favour of a rule of reason approach and an economics based analysis, but 
rather summarizes the Commission’s and the Community courts’ approach 
in tying cases. The outcome of the Commission’s discussion paper is 
therefore quite hard to predict. Also, the Commission is still reflecting on 
the comments received by the public and what the next step will be is 
unknown.  
 
Nevertheless, I believe that the discussion paper is just the start and that it 
will ultimately lead to more of a rule of reason approach. The comments 
received on the discussion paper, together with the debate on the tying 
approach will probably reveal a demand for a change in the current policy. 
Hopefully the outcome will be some kind of guidelines, where the tying 
policy is outlined. It will also be interesting to see how the Commission 
handles the next tying case that comes in front of it, and whether the 
approach in Microsoft will still be relevant. 
                                                 
158 Speech by Neelie Kroes at Fordham in 2005. 
159 Ibid. 
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